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CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES TO
MONTANA'S DRUNK DRIVING LAWS
Kelly M. O'Sullivan
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1983, the Montana Legislature enacted tough new drunk
driving laws.1 Because our culture accepts social drinking and be-
cause people drive after drinking, many people who normally
would have no contact with the criminal justice system will find
themselves charged with the crime of driving under the influence
of alcohol [hereinafter DUI]. These people will be accused of a se-
rious crime rather than a minor traffic offense and the penalties
are severe.2 As more people find themselves facing drunk driving
1. The Legislature enacted MONT. CODE ANN. § 61-8-406 (1983) which states: "It is
unlawful and punishable a provided in 61-8-722 for any person to drive or be in actual
physical control of a motor vehicle upon the ways of this state open to the public while the
alcohol concentration in his blood, breath, or urine is 0.10 or more." This section, commonly
called the per se statute, imposes a fine of not less than $100 or more than $500 and impris-
onment of not more than 10 days for the first conviction. It also imposes mandatory alcohol
school and suspension of the convicted person's driver's license for six months. MONT. CODE
ANN. § 61-8-722 (1983). The DUI statute, MONT. CODE ANN. § 61-8-401(1)(a) (1983) states:
"It is unlawful and punishable as provided in 61-8-714 for any person who is under the
influence of. . . alcohol to drive or be in actual physical control of a motor vehicle upon the
ways of this state open to the public." The penalty section of this statute was amended to
add the provisions for mandatory imprisonment. MONT. CODE ANN. § 61-8-714 (1983).
2. Under Montana's implied consent law, refusal to take the chemical test to deter-
mine blood alcohol content results in a driver's license suspension for up to three months for
a first refusal, and up to one year for a second or subsequent refusal. MONT. CODE ANN. § 61-
8-402(5) (1983). A person convicted of DUI faces imprisonment for not less than 24 hours or
more than 60 days, and a fine of not less than $100 or more than $500. On second convic-
tion, he faces imprisonment of not less than seven days or more than six months, and a fine
of $300 to $500. On third conviction, he faces imprisonment of not less than 30 days or more
than one year and a fine of $500 to $1,000. MONT. CODE ANN. § 61-8-714 (1983). In addition,
the defendant must complete an alcohol information course approved by the Department of
Institutions. Id. But those are not the only consequences of a DUI conviction. A person
convicted of DUI receives 10 habitual traffic offender points. MONT. CODE ANN. § 61-11-
203(2)(d) (1983). The accumulation of 30 points within three years means revocation of the
offender's license for three years. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 61-11-203(2), -211 (1983).
After conviction for DUI one's insurance rates skyrocket. Persons who have insurance
with a preferred company that insures good drivers for lower rates will have their insurance
cancelled or set up for nonrenewal when the insurance company gets a copy of the police
report that shows a ticket for DUI was issued. The insurance companies generally will can-
cel when they discover the ticket has been issued, regardless of the outcome of the litigation,
because they feel the driver was in a situation that places higher risk on them. The ticketed
driver must resort to the nonstandard market in order to get insurance. Rates are much
higher, because nonstandard companies insure higher-risk drivers. For example, a married
man over 40 who insured one vehicle (that was not a high risk vehicle) for full coverage
would pay $240 per year for insurance. If he got one DUI ticket, his insurance rates with a
nonstandard company would be $972 per year. A single male between ages 21 to 24 with one
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charges, the DUI laws in Montana will come under increasing at-
tack. Montana's DUI statutes have already faced several constitu-
tional challenges s and more are to come.
This article examines three separate constitutional issues in
Montana's DUI laws. The first issue is whether Montana's DUI
laws violate due process because they do not require a specific
mental state. It concludes the DUI laws are absolute liability laws
which do not violate due process. The second issue is whether the
law establishing the presumption of being under the influence of
alcohol at a specific blood alcohol content violates due process. It
concludes the presumption is constitutional, if the jury is properly
instructed. The third issue is whether the DUI law which legislates
an exception to Montana Rules of Evidence and admits reports of
chemical tests violates the separation of powers doctrine. It con-
DUI ticket would pay $684 per year for minimum liability coverage. A single male under 21
with one DUI ticket would pay $804 per year for minimum liability coverage. One DUI
ticket will affect insurance coverage for three and one-half to five years after it is issued.
Telephone interview with Nancy Reynolds of Chriss Crawford Insurance Agency (April 29,
1985). For people employed by union carriers, one DUI while on duty is grounds for imme-
diate discharge, regardless of length of service or quality of work. Nonunion carriers have
the same policy. Telephone interview with Jay Kronberg of Salt Creek Freightways (April
30, 1985).
3. The constitutional challenges to the DUI laws have been quite diverse. State v.
Jackson, 195 Mont. 185, 637 P.2d 1 (1981), vacated and remanded sub nom. Montana v.
Jackson, 460 U.S. 1030 (1983), on remand, - Mont. - , 672 P.2d 255 (1983), held that
the refusal to take the blood alcohol test was testimonial and the refusal could not be admit-
ted into evidence without violating the fifth amendment right against self-incrimination.
That decision was vacated by the United States Supreme Court in light of South Dakota v.
Neville, 459 U.S. 553 (1983). Montana v. Jackson, 460 U.S. 1030. Neville held that the re-
fusal to take a blood alcohol test was not protected by the fifth amendment privilege against
self-incrimination. The United States Supreme Court remanded Jackson to determine if the
decision rested on adequate and independent state grounds. Id. On remand, the Montana
Supreme Court held that the decision did not rest on adequate and independent state
grounds. Jackson, - Mont. at -, 672 P.2d at 258.
The DUI laws have also been challenged on the basis of right to counsel before deciding
whether to take the blood alcohol test. State v. Armfield, - Mont. -, 693 P.2d 1226
(1984) held that there is no general sixth amendment right to counsel before deciding
whether to take the blood alcohol test. For a detailed discussion of Armfield, see Note,
State v. Armfield: No Right to Counsel Under Montana's Implied Consent Statute, 46
MONT. L. REV. 349 (1985).
State v. Bruns, - Mont. -, 691 P.2d 817 (1984) held that a 10 month county jail
sentence for three DUI's and one count of driving with a suspended license was not cruel
and unusual punishment. The court also held that a sentence of 10 months does not violate
the equal protection clause because it was ordered to be served at the county jail where no
good time or parole is allowed.
State v. Finley, 173 Mont. 162, 566 P.2d 1119 (1977) held that the defendant's privilege
against self-incrimination is not violated by a videotape of the defendant's post-arrest
actions.
State v. Purdie, - Mont. -, 680 P.2d 576 (1984) held that field sobriety tests
commonly given to suspected drunk drivers are not a search protected under the fourth
amendment of the federal Constitution or Art. II, § 11 of the Montana Constitution.
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cludes the admission of such evidence does violate the separation
of powers. However, the chemical test results may still be admissi-
ble under existing Montana law.
II. ARE MONTANA'S DUI LAWS ABSOLUTE LIABILITY OFFENSES
WHICH VIOLATE THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE?
A. Intent Crimes and Public Welfare Offenses: An
Introduction
In English common law, a combination of vicious will and un-
lawful act4 were required to constitute a crime. Blackstone stated
that just as an involuntary act deserves no praise, it also deserves
no punishment.5 The only thing that renders human actions either
praiseworthy or culpable is the intent with which they are done.
The English common law concept of crime as a combination of
criminal intent and criminal action became a premise of American
criminal law.7 As states codified common law crimes, courts inter-
preted statutes which did not mention a specific intent as implic-
itly requiring intent, because intent was so inherent in the crime
no statutory affirmation Was needed.8
However, with the advent of the Industrial Revolution, in-
creased congestion in cities necessitated a new type of law not
based on the intent of the offender.' Health, safety, and traffic reg-
ulations evolved to protect society from the harmful acts of others,
intentional or not. The criminal justice system was seized upon as
a convenient vehicle for enforcing these regulations. 10 These regu-
lations, imposed under the police power of the state, were called
public welfare offenses.1 They require no mental state but only
the commission of the prohibited act. Therefore, they impose abso-
lute liability.12 Absolute liability is necessary because in doing the
prohibited act, the offender creates a risk of harm to others.'" Pub-
lic welfare offenses reflect a legislative policy decision that the risk
of harm created by the violation outweighs the possibility that the
offender may have acted innocently. Public welfare offenses are
4. 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *21.
5. Id.
6. Id. at *19-21.
7. "[E]ven a dog distinguishes between being stumbled over and being kicked." O.W.
HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAw 3 (1881).
8. Morisette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 252 (1952).
9. Id. at 253-54.
10. Sayre, Public Welfare Offenses, 33 COLUM. L. REv. 55, 69 (1933).
11. Id. at 56.
12. Id. at 78.
13. Id. at 68.
1985]
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generally distinguished from crimes because violations have small
penalties, and little effect on the offender's reputation. i"
B. Montana's DUI Laws
Montana prohibits drunk driving under two separate statutes.
One statute, commonly called the DUI law, states that any person
who is under the influence of alcohol and driving or in actual phys-
ical control of a motor vehicle upon the ways of the state open to
the public is guilty of DUI. 15 Another statute, generally called the
per se law, declares it to be a violation if a person is driving while
the alcohol concentration in his blood, breath, or urine is 0.10% or
more.16 Neither of these statutes explicitly requires any particular
mental state.
In interpreting the DUI laws, courts may imply a mental state.
Section 45-2-103(1) of the Montana Code Annotated declares a
person is not guilty of an offense, other than an absolute liability
offense, unless he acts knowingly, purposely, or negligently with re-
spect to each element of the crime.1 7 The Commission Comments
state as a general rule that a mental state should be implied by the
courts.'" A few courts in other states have implied mental states in
their DUI laws.' 9
On the other hand, the DUI laws could be interpreted as abso-
lute liability offenses. Section 45-2-104 of the Montana Code An-
notated states that a person may be absolutely liable for an offense
only if: the statute defining the offense clearly indicates a legisla-
14. Although strict liability offenses are supposed to have relatively small penalties,
the courts have upheld some rather large penalties. The United States Supreme Court up-
held a conviction for the sale of a substance containing narcotics as an absolute liability
offense which had a maximum penalty of five years in prison or a $2,000 fine or both. United
States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250 (1922) (discussed in Sayre, supra note 10, at 80-81). The
Montana Supreme Court upheld two convictions of sedition, an absolute liability offense,
that carried a maximum penalty of 20 years imprisonment. State v. Smith, 57 Mont. 563,
190 P. 107 (1920); State v. Kahn, 56 Mont. 108, 182 P. 107 (1919).
15. MONT. CODE ANN. § 61-8-401(1)(a) (1983).
16. MONT. CODE ANN. § 61-8-406 (1983).
17. MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-2-103(1) (1983).
18. MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-2-104 commission comments (1983).
19. Morgan v. Municipality of Anchorage, 643 P.2d 691 (Alaska 1982); Commonwealth
v. Wallace, 14 Mass. App. Ct. 358, 439 N.E.2d 848 (1982); Kaiser v. Suburban Transp. Sys.,
65 Wash. 2d 461, 398 P.2d 14, modified for typographical errors, 401 P.2d 350 (1965). In the
comments to the MODEL PENAL CODE, the drafters caution against the expectation that an
explicit statement of absolute liability appear in the law. Many laws have already been con-
strued to involve absolute liability where no explicit statement of intent exists. The drafters
state that either a settled interpretation or an explicit statement in the statute should suf-
fice. Whether or not a statute constitutes an absolute liability crime is a judgment deliber-
ately left to the courts. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.05 comment (Tentative Draft No. 4 1955).
[Vol. 46
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tive purpose to impose absolute liability, and the offense is punish-
able by a fine not exceeding $500.0 There is no clear legislative
statement in the DUI laws that they are designed to impose abso-
lute liability. However, another traffic regulation statute declares:
"[i]t is unlawful and, unless otherwise declared in this chapter [on
traffic regulation] with respect to particular offenses, it is a misde-
meanor for any person to do any act forbidden or fail to perform
any act required in this chapter."' Granted, this is somewhat less
than a clear legislative statement, but it could be interpreted as
requiring only the doing of a forbidden act in order to impose ab-
solute liability for traffic offenses.22 If the DUI laws are interpreted
as absolute liability crimes, then the mandatory jail time for DUI
cannot stand. Section 45-2-104 of the Montana Code Annotated
limits the punishment for an absolute liability offense to a $500
fine.2 s
C. DUI Laws in Other States
Many other states impose absolute liability for DUI and per se
offenses." Illinois held its DUI laws 2' to be absolute liability of-
20. MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-2-104 (1983).
21. MONT. CODE ANN. § 61-8-104 (1983).
22. MONT. CODE ANN. § 61-8-104 (1983) is identical to UNIFORM VEHICLE CODE § 11-102
(National Committee on Uniform Traffic Laws and Ordinances 1968). In the 1979 supple-
ment to the Uniform Traffic Laws, the committee recommended that if states wish to pro-
vide that minor traffic offenses are not misdemeanors, the word "violation" should be used
in place of the word "misdemeanor." The committee also recommended two options be in-
serted in the statute: (1) Section 11-808 (which prohibits racing on a highway), § 11-901
(which prohibits driving under the influence), § 11-903 (which prohibits vehicular homi-
cide), and § 11-904 (which prohibits fleeing or attempting to elude a police officer) as misde-
meanors; and (2) all other sections in the chapter on traffic regulations as infractions. UNI-
FORM VEHICLE CODE § 11-102 (National Committee on Uniform Traffic Laws and
Ordinances, Supplement III, 1979). The recommended penalty for an infraction is: for a first
conviction a fine of up to $200, for a second conviction within one year a fine of up to $300,
for a third conviction within one year a fine of up to $500. Id. at § 17-101.1. This system of
traffic infractions and penalties up to a $500 fine would bring the traffic code within the
limits set by MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-2-104 (1983). Undoubtedly, this change would help
clarify Montana law, but it would exempt the DUI statutes from the infraction system and
ignore the issue of mental state.
23. MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-2-104 (1983). See City of Missoula v. Shea, - Mont.
- . 661 P.2d 410 (1983). Shea used this statute to strike a parking ordinance penalty of
up to 90 days in jail and a $300 fine.
24. State v. Lujan, 139 Ariz. 236, 677 P.2d 1344 (1984) (per se statute, which prohib-
ited driving with a blood alcohol level of 0.10% or more, imposed absolute liability which
did not violate due process because the punishment was relatively light); State v. Thomp-
son, 138 Ariz. 341, 674 P.2d 895 (1983) (DUI is an absolute liability crime); People v. Wood-
ard, 143 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 1, 192 Cal. Rptr. 229 (1983) (per se law was strict liablity
crime); Bodoh v. District of Columbia Bureau of Motor Vehicle Servs., 377 A.2d 1135 (D.C.
1977) (defendant absolutely liable for DUI where he had consumed a prescription drug and
a small amount of alcohol, without knowledge of the consequences); People v. Ziltz, 98 Ill.
5
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fenses in People v. Teschner.26 Like Montana, Illinois follows the
general rule that mental state is implied in crimes that lack a spe-
cific mental state. Illinois statutes, too, declare absolute liability
to be an exception found only when clear legislative intent is
shown.2 8 The Illinois Appellate Court refused to imply a mental
state in its DUI laws, reasoning that requiring a mental state
would raise the possibility of an involuntary intoxication defense
to the crime of DUI and thus inadequately protect the citizens of
Illinois from drunk drivers.29 The court found a clear legislative
purpose to impose absolute liability in the language of the Illinois
DUI statute. "The fact that a person charged with [DUI] is or has
been entitled to use such drug under the laws of this State does
not constitute a defense against any charge of [DUI]." 30 The court
also relied on the general rule in Illinois, that as to motor vehicle
offenses, intent, motive, and knowledge are immaterial to the ques-
2d 38, 455 N.E.2d 70 (1983) (per se statute imposed absolute liability); People v. Teschner,
76 Ill. App. 3d 124, 394 N.E.2d 893 (1979) (DUI statute imposed absolute liability); State v.
West, 416 A.2d 5 (Me. 1980) (defendant's lack of knowledge of the effects of mixing her
tranquilizer and alcohol held to be irrelevant because DUI was an absolute liability crime);
People v. Schmidt, 127 Misc. 2d 102, 478 N.Y.S.2d 482 (1984) (per se law was strict liability
crime); State v. Grimsley, 3 Ohio App. 3d 265, 444 N.E.2d 1071 (1982) (defendant's split
personality was not a defense to DUI, rather DUI is an absolute liability crime); Common-
wealth v. Mikulan, - Pa. __, 470 A.2d 1339 (1983) (per se law was strict liability
crime).
25. The DUI law in Illinois is substantially similar to Montana's: "A person shall not
drive or be in actual physical control of any vehicle within this state while: ... under the
influence of alcohol." ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 95-1/2, § 11-501(a)(2) (Smith-Hurd 1985).
26. 76 Ill. App. 3d at 127, 394 N.E.2d at 895.
27. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 4-3 (Smith-Hurd 1971) states: "A person is not guilty of
an offense, other than an offense which involves absolute liability, unless, with respect to
each element described by the statute defining the offense he acts while having one of the
mental states described in Sections 4-4 through 4-7." Sections 4-4 through 4-7 are the code
sections which define mental states: § 4-4 defines intent, § 4-5 defines knowledge, § 4-6
defines recklessness, § 4-7 defines negligence. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 4-3 was the source for
MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-2-103. MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-2-103 commission comments (1983).
28. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 4-9 states:
A person may be guilty of an offense without having, as to each element thereof,
one of the mental states described in Sections 4-4 through 4-7 if the offense is a
misdemeanor which is not punishable by incarceration or by a fine exceeding $500,
or the statute defining the offense clearly indicates a legislative purpose to impose
absolute liability for the conduct described.
This statute was the source of MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-2-104. MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-2-104
commission comments (1983).
29. 76 Ill. App. 3d at 126, 394 N.E.2d at 895.
30. Id. at 127, 394 N.E.2d at 895. The Illinois Legislature recently modified the word-
ing of the quoted statute, but the meaning has not been substantially changed. ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 95-1/2, § 11-501(b) (Smith-Hurd 1985). MONT. CODE ANN. § 61-8-401(2) (1983)
states: "The fact that any person charged with [DUI] is or has been entitled to use alcohol
or such a drug under the laws of this state does not constitute a defense against any charge
of [DUI]."
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tion of guilt: "The only intention necessary for liability for violat-
ing the automobile laws is the doing of the act prohibited."3'
D. Policy Reasons for the Imposition of Absolute Liability for
DUI
Many policy considerations mandate that traffic regulations,
including the DUI laws, should be considered absolute liability of-
fenses. Traffic regulations belong to the class of regulatory offenses
that first established the absolute liability doctrine.3 Absolute lia-
bility offenses focus on the need to regulate behavior that causes
the risk of harm to others, regardless of the actor's intent. The
theory behind absolute liability crimes is that the need to provide
uniform efficient regulation of risk-causing behavior outweighs the
need for an individual determination of mental state. "It is need-
less to point out that, swamped with such appalling inundations of
cases of petty violations, the lower criminal courts would be physi-
cally unable to examine the subjective intent of each defendant,
even were such determination desirable.""3
In motor vehicle regulations especially, intent is irrelevant
since the doing of the prohibited act, running through a stop sign
for instance, causes the same risk of harm to others regardless of
whether the motorist did not see the sign, could not stop, or inten-
tionally drove through the stop sign. The same is true of the DUI
laws; even though the drunk driver does not intend harm to soci-
ety, he creates the risk of harm by drinking and driving.
When intent is implied in the DUI laws, a plethora of
problems arises. Intent must be applied to each element of the
crime.3 4 DUI consists of two elements: actual physical control of a
motor vehicle, and being under the influence of alcohol or drugs. 6
If intent were implied, it would require the defendant to have
knowledge that he was under the influence. One court rejected this
approach because it may allow a defendant to claim "his inten-
tional consumption of alcohol impaired his ability to know he was
intoxicated."36 Alternatively, courts may require a defendant's
knowledge of having been drinking and knowledge of being in ac-
tual physical control of a motor vehicle. But a knowledge of having
been drinking is not necessarily sufficient to sustain a conviction
31. 76 Ill. App. 3d at 125, 394 N.E.2d at 894.
32. Sayre, supra note 10, at 73.
33. Id. at 69.
34. MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-2-103(1) (1983).
35. 37 Op. Att'y Gen. 120 (1978).
36. Morgan v. Municipality of Anchorage, 643 P.2d at 692.
19851 335
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for being under the influence. One can drink a small amount with-
out being under the influence. This fact is recognized by Montana
law under which a person is presumed not to be under the influ-
ence if the alcohol concentration in his blood, breath, or urine is
0.05% or less. 7
The implication of intent as an element of DUI opens the door
for the defense of involuntariness. Several courts have held that
where a defendant takes a prescription drug without knowledge of
its harmful side effects, he cannot be charged with DUI since this
innocent mistake of fact negates intent and establishes the driver's
innocence. 8 Yet, a driver taking prescription medication is poten-
tially as harmful as a drunk driver. Since they create the same risk
of harm, they should be treated as any other drunk driver. There-
fore, in view of the case law and policy arguments in favor of mak-
ing DUI an absolute liability offense, the courts should declare
DUI to be an absolute liability offense, and in keeping with the
statutory limitation lower the maximum penalty to a $500 fine.
E. If Montana's DUI Laws Were Interpreted as Absolute
Liability Offenses Would They Violate Due Process?
The United States Supreme Court has generally upheld regu-
latory measures which impose absolute liability as valid exercises
of the state's police power.3 9 Regulatory measures, however, must
also meet the due process requirement of fairness. In Lambert v.
California,40 the Court struck down a Los Angeles strict liability
ordinance which required convicted persons to register with the
police as violative of due process. Despite a strong dissent, the
Court held that due process prohibited absolute liability for a
wholly passive failure to register where knowledge of the duty to
register was not shown.4 1 Lambert can be distinguished from Mon-
tana's DUI laws in several ways. The conduct in Lambert was
wholly passive, while DUI is not. In Lambert the defendant was
ignorant of the registration law, while the DUI laws have been
highly publicized. Finally, the failure to register in Lambert did
37. MONT. CODE ANN. § 61-8-401(3)(a) (1983).
38. Commonwealth v. Wallace, 14 Mass. App. Ct. 358, 439 N.E.2d 848 (1982); People
v. Koch, 250 A.D. 623, 294 N.Y.S, 987 (1937); Kaiser v. Suburban Transp. Sys., 65 Wash. 2d
461, 398 P.2d 14, modified for typographical errors, 401 P.2d 350 (1965).
39. United States v. Behrman, 258 U.S. 280 (1922) (upheld conviction for sale of a
narcotic drug without a prescription); United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250 (1922) (upheld
conviction for sale of narcotics); Shevlin-Carpenter Co. v. Minnesota, 218 U.S. 57 (1910)
(upheld conviction for cutting timber on state lands without a valid permit).
40. 355 U.S. 225 (1957).
41. Id.
336 [Vol. 46
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not cause a risk of harm to anyone, whereas DUI does.
In conclusion, if Montana's DUI laws were interpreted as ab-
solute liability crimes, they would be held to comport with due
process.
III. DOES MONTANA'S "UNDER THE INFLUENCE" PRESUMPTION
VIOLATE DUE PROCESS?
A. Types of Presumptions
The DUI law in Montana utilizes several presumptions. If the
defendant's alcohol concentration is 0.05% or less, he is presumed
not to be under the influence. If the alcohol concentration is be-
tween 0.05% and 0.10% no presumption arises. If the alcohol con-
centration is 0.10% or more, the defendant is presumed to be
under the influence.42
These presumptions must comply with the constitutional re-
quirements set down by the Supreme Court in In Re Winship,45
which held that due process requires the prosecution in a criminal
case to prove beyond a reasonable doubt every material fact neces-
sary to constitute the elements of the offense.44 Presumptions have
caused problems in the criminal context because, when a defen-
dant is convicted on the basis of a presumption, the prosecution
does not need to prove every fact necessary to constitute every ele-
ment of the crime, but rather proves the basic facts and then
utilizes a presumption to establish the existence of the ultimate
fact." This conflicts with the presumption of innocence which
guarantees the defendant the constitutional right to "sit on his
hands" and force the prosecution to prove each element of the
crime charged. 6 To examine how presumptions may be used in the
DUI laws, one must understand the two types of rebuttable pre-
sumptions and their functions.
There are two types of rebuttable presumptions:47 burden of
42. MONT. CODE ANN. § 61-8-401(3) (1983).
43. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
44. Id. at 364.
45. For a review of presumptions in general see Graham, Evidence and Trial Advo-
cacy Workshop-Presumptions-More Than You Ever Wanted To Know and Yet Were
Too Disinterested to Ask, 17 CRaM. L. BULL. 431 (1981); Laughlin, In Support of the Thayer
Theory of Presumption, 52 MICH. L. REV. 195 (1953); Morgan, Some Observations Concern-
ing Presumptions, 44 HARV. L. REV. 906 (1931). For an excellent article that examines pre-
sumptions in relation to DUI laws see Thompson, The Constitutionality of Chemical Test
Presumptions of Intoxication In Motor Vehicle Statutes, 20 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 301 (1983).
46. United States v. Gainey, 380 U.S. 63 (1965); Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432
(1894).
47. There are two other types of presumptions: conclusive presumptions and permissive
1985] 337
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proof shifting presumptions"8 and burden of production shifting
presumptions.4 9 Burden of proof shifting rebuttable presumptions
force the defendant to overcome the presumption by introducing
some quantum of evidence, generally a preponderance." Burden of
proof shifting presumptions have been found to be unconstitu-
tional in criminal cases because they allow the state to shift the
burden of proof to the defendant."' In -criminal cases, the state
must prove beyond a reasonable doubt every element of the of-
fense charged. 52 Burden of production shifting rebuttable pre-
sumptions require the defendant to introduce some evidence to re-
but the presumption, but the requisite amount of evidence needed
to rebut varies. 53 Burden of production shifting presumptions are
constitutional. If the presumption is the prosecution's sole evi-
dence and the jury is not free to reject the presumption, the under-
lying fact proved must be sufficient to support the inference of
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. If the jury is free to reject the
presumption or if it is not the sole evidence of the crime, the ulti-
mate fact must be more likely than not to flow from the basic
facts. 4
B. Presumptions in Montana
Montana law utilizes a rebuttable presumption that a person
with an alcohol concentration of 0.10% or more is under the influ-
ence.5 5 In order for the rebuttable presumption to be constitutional
the jury clearly must be instructed that the presumption is rebut-
table and that it may be rebutted by the production of some evi-
dence. In addition, if the trier of fact must decide in accordance
presumptions. Conclusive presumptions are mandatory. MONT. R. EVID. 301(b)(1) (1977).
The defendant may not overcome a contrary conclusive presumption by introducing evi-
dence, and the jury has no discretion in its application. Id.; Thompson, supra note 45, at
306. Conclusive presumptions are unconstitutional in the criminal context because they al-
low the state to rely on a rule of law to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Sandstrom v.
Montana, 442 U.S. 510 (1979). Permissive presumptions are commonly known as inferences.
An inference places no burden on the defendant. County Court of Ulster County v. Allen,
442 U.S. 140, 157 (1979). Inferences are constitutional because they are entirely within the
discretion of the factfinder and have no effect on the burden of proof. Id.
48. Thompson, supra note 45, at 306-07.
49. Id.
50. MONT. R. EvID. 301(b)(2) (1977).
51. Sandstrom, 442 U.S. 510.
52. Sandstrom relied on Patterson v. New York, which held that "a state must prove
every ingredient of an offense beyond a reasonable doubt, and ... may not shift the burden
of proof to the defendant." Patterson, 432 U.S. 197, 215 (1977).
53. Thompson, supra note 45, at 306-07.
54. Ulster County, 442 U.S. at 164-67.
55. MONT. CODE ANN. § 61-8-401(3)(c) (1983).
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with the presumption, and it is the sole evidence of the crime, it is
necessary that the underlying fact proved be sufficient to support
the inference beyond a reasonable doubt. Otherwise, a mere ra-
tional connection must exist.5" If the jury were properly instructed
there should be no constitutional problem in using a rebuttable
burden of production shifting presumption in the DUI laws.
The Montana Supreme Court's decision in City of Missoula v.
Shea,5 however, may preclude the use of rebuttable presumptions
altogether. Shea was convicted in Municipal Court of a number of
parking ordinance violations. One of the issues in Shea was the
presumption in the Missoula city parking ordinances that the reg-
istered owner of the vehicle parked it. The court looked to a three-
part test developed by the Washington Supreme Court to deter-
mine the constitutionality of criminal presumptions: (1) a pre-
sumption may shift the burden of production of evidence to the
defendant, but it may not operate to relieve the prosecution of its
burden of persuasion beyond a reasonable doubt on any element of
the crime; (2) a presumed fact must follow from the basic fact be-
yond a reasonable doubt; and (3) the trier of fact must know the
presumption allows, but does not require it, to infer the presumed
fact from the basic fact.58 The court used the three-part Washing-
ton test as a guide in reviewing the constitutionality of the pre-
sumption that the registered owner parked the vehicle. In applying
the Washington test, the court cited Rule 301(b)(2) of the Mon-
tana Rules of Evidence which defines a rebuttable presumption.
"A disputable presumption may be overcome by a preponderance
of evidence contrary to the presumption. Unless the presumption
is overcome, the trier of fact must find the assumed fact in accor-
dance with the presumption." 59 The court in Shea held that the
challenged presumption violated due process by shifting the bur-
den of proof to the defendant ° since the trier of fact was not free
to accept or reject the presumption.
The application of Rule 301(b)(2) to presumptions in criminal
cases causes serious problems in Montana law. Rule 301(b)(2) de-
fines all rebuttable presumptions as burden of proof shifting pre-
sumptions. 1 Burden of proof shifting presumptions have been un-
56. Ulster County, 442 U.S. at 165; Thompson, supra note 45, at 311-12.
57. - Mont. - , 661 P.2d 410 (1983).
58. Id. at -, 661 P.2d at 413 (citing State v. Roberts, 88 Wash. 2d 337, 562 P.2d
1259 (1977)).
59. MONT. R. EVID. 301(b)(2) (1977). Rebuttable presumptions are called disputable
presumptions in Montana.
60. Shea, - Mont. at - , 661 P.2d at 414.
61. MONT. R. EvID. 301(b)(2).
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constitutional in the criminal context since United States v.
Sandstrom." The Court in Sandstrom held that the state must
prove every element of an offense beyond a reasonable doubt."
Rule 301, however, has never been changed to reflect the Sand-
strom decision. With the resurrection of Rule 301 and its applica-
tion to criminal cases, the Montana Supreme Court raised the pos-
sibility that all presumptions in criminal cases could be struck
down as violative of due process. All that would be left in Montana
would be inferences."
Striking the presumptions in the DUI laws could have serious
consequences. The Federal Highway Safety Act 6 5 requires states to
enact statutes on implied consent and presumptive levels of intoxi-
cation in order to receive federal highway funds.6 It would indeed
be unfortunate if Rule 301 were used to strike rebuttable presump-
tions in Montana since the problem lies, not with Montana's DUI
laws, but with Rule 301(b)(2).
In conclusion, the rebuttable presumption that a person with
an alcohol concentration of 0.10% or more is under the influence is
constitutional, if the jury is properly instructed. The jury must be
instructed that the presumption is rebuttable by the production of
some evidence. Generally, the ultimate fact must be more likely
than not to flow from the basic facts. But if the jury must accept
the presumption, and it is the sole evidence of the crime, the facts
proved by the state must be sufficient to support beyond a reason-
able doubt the inference of guilt. 7 However, if the Montana Su-
preme Court extends the holding of Shea to the DUI laws, the re-
buttable presumptions in the DUI laws would be unconstitutional.
IV. DOES THE DUI LAW WHICH LEGISLATES AN ExCEPTION TO
THE MONTANA RULES OF EVIDENCE VIOLATE THE SEPARATION OF
POWERS?
A. Introduction
Prior to the adoption of the Rules of Evidence, chemical test
62. 442 U.S. at 524.
63. Id. at 520-21.
64. It should be noted that the inference used in Sandstrom continues to be used in
Montana, but the jury is clearly instructed that they may infer a person intends the ordi-
nary consequences of his acts. State v. Bad Horse Jr., 185 Mont. 507, 519, 605 P.2d 1113,
1119 (1980); State v. Coleman, 185 Mont. 299, 393, 605 P.2d 1000, 1051, cert. denied, 446
U.S. 970 (1979); State v. Williams, 185 Mont. 140, 155, 604 P.2d 1224, 1232 (1979).
65. 23 U.S.C. § 402 (1982) (Supp. 1985).
66. Highway Safety Program Standard No. 8, 23 C.F.R. § 1204.4 (1985). See generally
Thompson, supra note 45, at 317.
67. Ulster County, 442 U.S. at 164-67; Thompson, supra note 45, at 301.
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reports were admissible in Montana under the public records ex-
ception to the hearsay rule. 5 But that changed with the adoption
of the Rules of Evidence. The commission comments to the Mon-
tana Rules of Evidence state that chemists' reports are no longer
admissible under the public records exception. 9 Yet Montana's
DUI laws legislate the admissibility of chemical alcohol test re-
ports.70 In Montana, the Supreme Court, not the Legislature, es-
tablishes rules of evidence and procedure.7 ' The Legislature vio-
lated the separation of powers doctrine by enacting a law that
conflicts with the rules of evidence.72 Section 61-8-404(1)(b) of the
Montana Code Annotated, which admits chemical test reports,
should be struck down.
B. The Public Records Exception to the Hearsay Rule
The hearsay rule excludes out-of-court statements offered into
evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.7 Hearsay is
excluded because it is less reliable than live testimony.74 The relia-
68. State v. Snider, 168 Mont. 220, 541 P.2d 1204 (1975) upheld the admission of a
state chemist's report analyzing a substance as marijuana under the Uniform Official Re-
ports as Evidence Act. MONT. RED. CODE § 93-901-1 (1947) (superseded 1977) was the Uni-
form Official Reports as Evidence Act: "Written reports or findings of fact made by officers
of this state, on a matter within the scope of their duty as defined by statute, shall, in so far
as relevant, be admitted as evidence of the matters stated therein."
69. MONT. R. EVID. 803(8) commission comments. The commission comments expressly
state that Snider is overruled.
70. MONT. CODE ANN. § 61-8-404(1)(b) (1983) states:
(b) a report of the facts and results of any chemical test of a person's blood,
breath, or urine administered under 61-8-402 is admissible in evidence if:
(i) the breath analysis report was prepared and verified by the person who
performed the test or the blood or urine test was a laboratory analysis and the
analysis was done in a laboratory operated by the department of justice or by any
other laboratory or facility certified or exempt from certification under the rules of
the department; and
(ii) the report was prepared in accordance with any applicable rules of the
department; and
(iii) if the test was on a 'blood sample, the person withdrawing the blood
must have been competent to do so under 61-8-405(1).
71. MONT. CONST. art. VII, § 2(3) provides: "[The supreme court] may make rules gov-
erning appellate procedure, practice and procedure for all other courts .... "
72. Coate v. Omholt, - Mont. -, 662 P.2d 591 (1983) held that the Montana
Supreme Court has authority to adopt rules of procedure subject only to legislative veto.
Once a legislative veto is exercised, however, the Legislature is not empowered to enact laws
to fill the void.
73. C. McCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 246 (2d ed. 1972). MONT. R. EVID. 802 is the hearsay
rule: "Hearsay is not admissible except as otherwise provided by statute, these rules, or
other rules applicable in the courts of this state."
74. The four risks traditionally associated with hearsay are: ambiguity, false testi-
mony, failure of memory, and misperception. 4 D. LouIsEuL & C. MuELLER, EVIDENCE § 413
(1980).
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bility of live testimony is due to the fact it is given under oath, in
person, and subject to cross-examination.7 But due to the burden
of producing live testimony, there are a number of exceptions in
the hearsay rule.
One of those exceptions is the public records exception. The
public records exception admits public agency records kept as a
regular course of activity pursuant to a duty imposed by law. 8
Public records are admitted as an exception to the hearsay rule
due to necessity and the reliability of the records.77 The public
records exception is necessary in two ways. First, it allows the in-
troduction of evidence without calling the public official. 8 If public
officials were required to introduce all public documents, they
would spend all their time in court. Second, if the statement is a
routine matter, the public official often does not remember it.79
Thus the written record gives a more accurate reflection of the
event than the official could give. Public records are reliable in sev-
eral ways. First, the records are part of a habit of routine record-
keeping.80 Second, they are made at or near the time of the event
when no motive for misrepresentation exists.81 Third, they are
made pursuant to duty imposed by law.82
C. Montana's Public Records Exception
Prior to the adoption of the Montana Rules of Evidence,
75. 4 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE 800-16 (1984).
76. MONT. R. EVID. 803(8) is the public records exception:
To the extent not otherwise provided in this paragraph, records, reports, state-
ments, or data compilations in any form of a public office or agency setting forth
its regularly conducted and regularly recorded activities, or matters observed pur-
suant to duty imposed by law and as to which there was a duty to report, or
factual findings resulting from an investigation made pursuant to authority
granted by law. The following are not within this exception to the hearsay rule: (i)
investigative reports by police and other law enforcement personnel; (ii) investiga-
tive reports prepared by or for a government, a public office, or an agency when
offered by it in a case in which it is a party; (iii) factual findings offered by the
government in criminal cases; (iv) factual findings resulting from special investiga-
tion of a particular complaint, case, or incident; and (v) any matter as to which
the sources of information or other circumstances indicate lack of trustworthiness.
77. 5 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1420 (1974).
78. Id. at § 1631; Wong Wing Foo v. McGrath, 196 F.2d 120 (9th Cir. 1952).
79. MONT. R. EVID. 803(8) commission comments (1977) (quoting the Advisory Com-
mittee's Note to Federal Rule 803(8), 56 F.R.D. 183, 311 (1972)).
80. Id.
81. 5 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 1526-27.
82. Wigmore states that official honor may not be what it ought to be, but at least
insofar as the law of evidence is concerned, it is a "fiction we can hardly afford . openly
to repudiate." Id. at § 1632.
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chemists' reports were admissible in Montana. In State v. Snider,83
the court held the written report of a substance analysis by a
chemist at the state crime laboratory admissible as a statutory ex-
ception to the hearsay rule pursuant to the Uniform Official Re-
ports as Evidence Act [Evidence Act].84 The Evidence Act allowed
the admission of reports made by officers of the state on matters
within the scope of their duties, without requiring the presence of
the officers to verify their reports or to be cross-examined. 5
The Montana Rules of Evidence changed the public records
exception to the hearsay rule. Montana's current public records ex-
ception to the hearsay rule states the general exception for admis-
sibility of public records but then lists a number of statements
which are not admissible. 6 Excluded are investigative reports and
factual findings offered by the government in a criminal case.
8 7
This excludes the type of written report admitted as evidence in
the Snider case. Lest any doubts should remain, the commission
comments to the Montana Rules of Evidence state that the Snider
case is overruled by the adoption of the Rules of Evidence.88 Thus,
under the Rules of Evidence, chemists' reports offered as an excep-
tion to the hearsay rule by the government in a criminal case are
inadmissible. Montana's DUI laws, however, legislate just such an
exception. 9 Section 61-8-404(1)(b) of the Montana Code Anno-
tated allows chemical test reports into evidence, without the testi-
mony of the chemist who performed the tests.90
83. 168 Mont. 220, 541 P.2d 1204 (1975).
84. MONT. REV. CODE § 93-901-1 (1947) (superseded 1977). For the text of the Evi-
dence Act see supra note 68.
85. Id.
86. MONT. R. EVID. 803(8) (1983). For the text of the public records exception see
supra note 76.
87. Id.
88. MoN'. R. EVID. 803(8) commission comments. It is unclear what weight should be
given to the commission comments which overrule Snider. In State v. Nelson, 172 Mont. 65,
560 P.2d 897 (1977), the court interpreted the Evidence Act to exclude a written police
report which detailed information the officer had received from a confidential informant and
how the information was used in an arrest. In dicta, the court stated that Snider had al-
ready held that the written reports of results of chemical testing were admissible under the
Evidence Act. Id. at 901. The Nelson case was decided on February 24, 1977, between the
time the Rules of Evidence were adopted and their effective date. It is unclear what, if any,
conclusions are to be drawn from the Nelson decision. It is a case decided under the old
rules, but it may indicate the court is unwilling to follow the commission comments in over-
ruling Snider.
89. Mor. CODE ANN. § 61-8-404(1)(b) (1983).
90. For the text of the statute see supra note 70.
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D. Separation of Powers
Section 2(3) of article VII of the Montana Constitution gives
the supreme court the power to make rules governing practice and
procedure for all courts.9 1 The rules promulgated by the supreme
court may be disapproved by the legislature in either of the two
legislative sessions that follow the rules' promulgation. " The Mon-
tana Supreme Court adopted the Rules of Evidence on December
29, 1976, effective July 1, 1977.'" The Legislature could have disap-
proved the Rules of Evidence during either the 1979 or 1981 legis-
lative session, but did not. Section 61-8-404(1)(b) of the Montana
Code Annotated was not enacted until 1983, after the time for leg-
islative disapproval had passed. The Legislature, in enacting sec-
tion 61-8-404(1)(b), encroached on the rulemaking authority of the
Montana Supreme Court. 4 This legislative exception to the Rules
of Evidence should be struck down as violative of the separation of
powers.
E. Consequences of Finding Section 61-8-404(1)(b) of the
Montana Code Annotated Unconstitutional
Section 61-8-404(1)(b) of the Montana Code Annotated allows
three types of reports into evidence: breath test reports, blood test
reports, and urine test reports.9 5 If section 61-8-404(1)(b) were
found unconstitutional, the alcohol test reports would have to be
admitted, if at all, under the public records exception to the hear-
say rule. The public records exception states the general rule that
statements of a public official made in the course of regularly con-
ducted activities pursuant to duty imposed by law are admissible. 6
The rule then lists exceptions which are not admissible: investiga-
tive reports by police and other law enforcement personnel and
factual findings offered by the government in a criminal case.9
7
These reports are excluded due to the inherent untrustworthiness
of records prepared by the government in anticipation of litigation
when there exists the motive and opportunity for bias.
8
91. See supra note 71; Coate, - Mont. at -, 662 P.2d at 600.
92. "Rules of procedure shall be subject to disapproval by the legislature in either of
the two sessions following promulgation." MONT. CoNsT. art. VII, § 2(3).
93. Sup. Ct. Ord. 12729 (1976).
94. See also Coate, - Mont. at -, 662 P.2d at 591.
95. MONT. CODE ANN. § 61-8-404(1)(b) (1983).
96. MONT. R. EVID. 803(8) (1977).
97. Id.
98. Comments on MONT. R. EvID. 803(8) (1977) by Professor William F. Crowley, Uni-
versity of Montana School of Law, to his 1984 evidence class (Mar. 24, 1984).
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By implication, the types of statements that should be admit-
ted under the general rule are those with substantial guarantees of
trustworthiness. Statements which lack guarantees of trustworthi-
ness should be excluded. Thus, the public records exception re-
quires a distinction between untrustworthy or evaluative lab re-
ports and trustworthy or routine lab reports.
In recent years, there has been a growing recognition of the
distinction between evaluative and routine lab reports. Evaluative
reports are those which contain hearsay from witnesses, opinions,
and subjective judgments by the investigator.9 Evaluative police
records and reports have generally been excluded because of their
inherent unreliability.100 The unreliability of these reports stems
from the adversarial nature of the reports prepared in anticipation
of litigation, and the opportunity and motive for bias that exists in
making subjective evaluations.0 Montana has traditionally ex-
cluded evaluative reports other than lab reports despite attempts
to admit them under the Evidence Act. 10 2 The Montana Supreme
Court has repeatedly held unsworn evaluative reports
inadmissible.10 3
This doctrine should be expanded to include highly evaluative
laboratory tests as well." 4 Evaluative lab reports can be unreliable
either because of their subjective content and adversarial circum-
stances in their preparation or because of the reliance on hearsay
data to do the tests.10 5 When the reliability of an evaluative lab
test is an issue, the report should not be admitted as part of the
public records exception to the hearsay rule. Rather, the report
should be excluded as an exception to the public records rule. This
would force the chemist to testify at trial and allow for cross-exam-
99. Alexander, The Hearsay Exception for Public Records in Federal Criminal Trials,
47 ALB. L. Rv. 699 (1983); Imwinkelried, The Constitutionality of Introducing Evaluative
Laboratory Reports Against Criminal Defendants, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 621 (1979).
100. Alexander, supra note 99, at 712.
101. Id. at 710.
102. Montana has never allowed evaluative/investigative type reports to be admitted
into evidence either as official records or as business records. In re Swan, 173 Mont. 311, 567
P.2d 898 (1977); Nelson, 172 Mont. at 65, 560 P.2d at 897; Pessl v. Bridger Bowl, 164 Mont.
389, 524 P.2d 1101 (1974); Richardson v. Farmers Union Oil Co., 131 Mont. 535, 312 P.2d
134 (1957).
103. Swan, 173 Mont. at 314, 567 P.2d at 900; Nelson, 172 Mont. at 72, 560 P.2d at
901; Richardson, 131 Mont. at 553, 312 P.2d at 144.
104. Laboratory reports can be either evaluative or routine, depending on the nature
of the test. Evaluative lab tests are ones which contain subjective judgments by the scien-
tist, such as polygraph interpretations. Routine tests, such as fingerprint identification, al-
low no subjective judgments. Alexander, supra note 99, at 727; Imwinkelried, supra note 99,
at 638-39.
105. Alexander, supra note 99, at 724.
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ination on the suspect areas of reliability.'06
Objective or routine lab reports allow no opportunity for sub-
jectivity because they consist merely of mathematical or chemical
procedures.'0 7 These reports admit of no opportunity for bias.
Thus, their reliability is quite high. A number of courts have recog-
nized these reports as being objective fact or routine, with little
room for error.'08 Like evaluative tests, routine tests are performed
in preparation for litigation, but routine tests do not allow for the
possibility of bias. They are intrinsically neutral, and yield findings
that may help the prosecution. Yet they may also yield findings
that will force the prosecution to dismiss charges.'09
The three types of lab reports being discussed here-blood al-
cohol reports, urine alcohol reports, and breath alcohol re-
ports-should all be admitted as routine lab reports. Both blood
and urine alcohol tests use gas chromatography.1 0 The testing in-
cludes a mathematical calculation to determine the presence of al-
cohol.1  The tests cannot be altered by subjective judgments of
the scientists who perform them." 2 Breath tests can be performed
using other methods, but they too consist of a mathematical calcu-
lation of the presence of alcohol in the breath." 3 They also cannot
be altered by any subjective judgments of the operator of the
machine." 4
Other courts have not yet decided if blood alcohol or urine
alcohol tests should be considered routine. However, Alaska recog-
nized the breathalyzer test as a routine test in Byrne v. State."' In
Byrne the defendant argued that the trial court incorrectly admit-
ted the breathalyzer packet"' under Alaska's public records excep-
tion to the hearsay rule, which is substantially similar to Mon-
106. Imwinkelried, supra note 99, at 645.
107. Alexander, supra note 99, at 727-28.
108. See, e.g., Kay v. United States, 255 F.2d 476, 480 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S.
825 (1958); State v. Kreck, 86 Wash. 2d 112, 119-21, 542 P.2d 782, 785-88 (1975); People v.
Porter, 46 A.D.2d 307, 311-13, 362 N.Y.S.2d 249, 255-56 (1974).
109. Imwinkelried, supra note 99, at 629.
110. Interview with Jim Hutchison and Rick Morehead, Missoula Crime Laboratory
(June 14, 1985).
111. Gas chromatography can identify the presence and amounts of specific types of
alcohol. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. 654 P.2d 795 (Alaska 1982).
116. The breathalyzer packet consisted of a number of documents that certified the
breathalyzer machine was working properly. State v. Huggins, 659 P.2d 613, 614 (Alaska
1982).
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tana's. 117 The court held that before a report fell within the
sections barring admission of the evidence, the person making the
report would have to be able to "foresee its use in litigation and
use this knowledge to manipulate the ultimate decision in the liti-
gation."' 1 8 The court stated that a state employee could not tam-
per with the results or findings in a breathalyzer packet in time to
affect a specific prosecution; thus, the results of the breathalyzer
exam were admissible.
In conclusion, the DUI law which allows the admission of
chemical test reports as an exception to the Montana Rules of Evi-
dence is unconstitutional as a violation of the separation of powers.
But if the Montana Supreme Court adopts the evaluative/routine
test distinction, breath, blood, and urine alcohol test results would
still be admissible under Montana law.
V. CONCLUSION
This article has examined three separate areas of constitu-
tional concern. The first area was whether the DUI laws are abso-
lute liability laws, and if so, do they violate due process. While the
DUI laws are absolute liability laws, which require that the penalty
be reduced to a maximum of a $500 fine, the DUI laws do not oth-
erwise violate due process. The second area examined was whether
a rebuttable presumption of being under the influence violates due
process. The presumption does not, as long as the jury is properly
instructed. The third area examined was whether section 61-8-
404(1)(b) of the Montana Code Annotated is constitutional as vio-
lates the separation of powers doctrine. It does, but if the court
adopts the evaluative/routine test distinction, breath, blood, and
urine alcohol test reports should still be admissible in Montana.
117. Montana adopted the Uniform Rule 803(8). 4 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEIN-
STEIN'S EVIDENCE 803-273 (1984). Alaska did also, but added "of this subdivision" and a
notification requirement. Id. at 803-274.
118. Byrne, 654 P.2d at 797.
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